



## **Foreign Policy -- Defense -- Documents on the web -- April 2011**

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### **GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS:**

#### **The White House: Remarks**

Please find below the link to Remarks and Statements by President Obama and other White House Officials:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks>

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-and-releases>

### **Department of State: Remarks**

Please find below the link to Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton and other Department of State Officials:

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/index.htm>

#### **REMARKS ON THE KILLING OF USAMA BIN LADIN**

By Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Treaty Room. Washington, DC. May 2, 2011

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/05/162339.htm>

### **Key U.S. Government Reports**

#### **REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND UNITED STATES PLAN FOR SUSTAINING THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES**

A Department of Defense Report. April 2011. 131 pages.

[http://www.defense.gov/news/1230\\_1231Report.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_1231Report.pdf)

#### **U.S. CASUALTIES STATUS UPDATES**

Department of Defense. May 4, 2011.

<http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf>

#### **CIVIL-MILITARY EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN**

A Briefing by Gen. Richard Mills, former Commander, Regional Command (Southwest) and I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) Dereck Hogan, Senior Advisor to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. April 27, 2011.

<http://fpc.state.gov/161840.htm>

#### **SECRETARY CLINTON'S TRIP TO BERLIN FOR THE INFORMAL NATO FOREIGN MINISTERIAL MEETING**

By Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary. April 19, 2011.

<http://fpc.state.gov/161200.htm>

#### **SECURITY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC**

By Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). April 11, 2011.

<http://fpc.state.gov/160496.htm>

#### **COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2010**

By Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary. April 8, 2011.

<http://fpc.state.gov/160395.htm>

**2011 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT**

Annual report by the Department of State to Congress, prepared in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act. March 3, 2011.

Vol. I: Drug and chemical Control: 596 pages.

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156575.pdf>

Vol. II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: 191 pages.

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156589.pdf>

**U.S. Government Accountability Office:****NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DOD AND NNSA NEED TO BETTER MANAGE SCOPE OF FUTURE REFURBISHMENTS AND RISKS TO MAINTAINING U.S. COMMITMENTS TO NATO**

U.S. Government Accountability Office. May 2, 2011. 53 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11387.pdf>

**COAST GUARD: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO FURTHER IMPROVE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES**

U.S. Government Accountability Office. April 13, 2011. 32 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11480.pdf>

**DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S FISCAL YEAR 2012 CORROSION PREVENTION AND CONTROL BUDGET REQUEST**

U.S. Government Accountability Office. April 13, 2011. 37 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11490r.pdf>

**MISSILE DEFENSE: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

U.S. Government Accountability Office. April 13, 2011. 18 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11555t.pdf>

**JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER: RESTRUCTURING PLACES PROGRAM ON FIRMER FOOTING, BUT PROGRESS STILL LAGS**

U.S. Government Accountability Office. April 7, 2011. 52 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11325.pdf>

**DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: CH-53K HELICOPTER PROGRAM HAS ADDRESSED EARLY DIFFICULTIES AND ADOPTED STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS FUTURE RISKS**

U.S. Government Accountability Office. April 4, 2011. 23 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11332.pdf>

**DEFENSE BIOMETRICS: DOD CAN BETTER CONFORM TO STANDARDS AND SHARE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES**

U.S. Government Accountability Office. March 31, 2011. 50 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11276.pdf>

**NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: MORE PROGRESS NEEDED IN IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IAEA'S TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM**

U.S. Government Accountability Office. March 17, 2011. 18 pages.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11482t.pdf>

**Congressional Research Service**

*Just clicking on the links may not open the documents. In that case please copy/paste the urls in your browser to be able to read them.*

**OSAMA BIN LADEN'S DEATH: IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS**

By John Rollins. Congressional Research Service. May 5, 2011. 26 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/163138.pdf>

**UGANDA: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND THE CRISIS IN NORTH UGANDA**

By Ted Dagne. Congressional Research Service. April 29, 2011. 40 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162753.pdf>

**INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS**

By Richard A. Best Jr. Congressional Research Service. April 28, 2011. 30 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162749.pdf>

**SYRIA: ISSUES FOR THE 112TH CONGRESS AND BACKGROUND ON U.S. SANCTIONS**

By Jeremy M. Sharp. Congressional Research Service. April 28, 2011. 29 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162748.pdf>

**PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA**

By Lauren Ploch, Christopher M. Blanchard, Ronald O'Rourke, R. Chuck Mason, Rawle O. King. Congressional Research Service. April 27, 2011. 47 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162745.pdf>

**SECURING NUCLEAR MATERIALS: THE 2010 SUMMIT AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS**

By Mary Beth Nikitin. Congressional Research Service. April 27, 2011. 28 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162744.pdf>

**KUWAIT: SECURITY, REFORM, AND U.S. POLICY**

By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. April 26, 2011. 18 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162743.pdf>

**NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES: A PRIMER**

By Paul P. Kerr, Mary Beth Nikitin. Congressional Research Service. April 22, 2011. 16 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162773.pdf>

**THE NEW START TREATY: CENTRAL LIMITS AND KEY PROVISIONS**

By Amy F. Woolf. Congressional Research Service. April 21, 2011. 36 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/162767.pdf>

**AFGHANISTAN: POST-TALIBAN GOVERNANCE, SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY**

By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. April 15, 2011. 97 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161567.pdf>

**ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, AND GEORGIA: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS**

By Jim Nichol. Congressional Research Service. April 15, 2011. 48 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161573.pdf>

**POLITICAL TRANSITION IN TUNISIA**

By Alexis Arieff. Congressional Research Service. April 15, 2011. 32 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161570.pdf>

**FRANCE: FACTORS SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY, AND ISSUES IN U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS**

By Paul Belkin. Congressional Research Service. April 14, 2011. 25 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161576.pdf>

**SUDAN: THE CRISIS IN DARFUR AND STATUS OF THE NORTH-SOUTH PEACE AGREEMENT**

By Ted Dagne. Congressional Research Service. April 8, 2011. 38 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161331.pdf>

**TURKEY-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES**

By Jim Zanotti. Congressional Research Service. April 8, 2011. 50 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161332.pdf>

#### **IRAN: U.S. CONCERNS AND POLICY RESPONSES**

By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. April 7, 2011. 71 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161325.pdf>

#### **COTE D'IVOIRE'S POST-ELECTION CRISIS**

By Nicolas Cook. Congressional Research Service. April 5, 2011. 79 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161336.pdf>

#### **IRAN SANCTIONS**

By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. April 4, 2011. 69 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161339.pdf>

#### **NIGERIA: ELECTIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS**

By Lauren Ploch. Congressional Research Service. April 1, 2011. 33 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161341.pdf>

#### **CENTRAL AMERICA REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS**

By Peter J. Meyer, Clare Ribando Seelke. Congressional Research Service. March 30, 2011. 40 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161343.pdf>

#### **OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN (LIBYA): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS**

By Jeremiah Gertler. Congressional Research Service. March 30, 2011. 33 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161350.pdf>

#### **LIBYA: UNREST AND U.S. POLICY**

By Christopher M. Blanchard. Congressional Research Service. March 29, 2011. 37 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159788.pdf>

#### **WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE**

By Richard F. Grimmett. Congressional Research Service. March 25, 2011. 23 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159786.pdf>

**ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION: A CATALOG OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS**

By Amy F. Woolf, Mary Beth Nikitin, Paul K. Kerr. Congressional Research Service. March 23, 2011. 71 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161346.pdf>

**STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS: FY2011 BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS**

By Marian Leonardo Lawson, Susan B. Epstein, Tamara J. Resler. Congressional Research Service. March 23, 2011. 35 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161352.pdf>

**AFRICA COMMAND: U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN AFRICA**

By Lauren Ploch. Congressional Research Service. March 22, 2011. 43 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161354.pdf>

**JAPAN 2011 EARTHQUAKE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) RESPONSE**

By Andrew Feickert, Emma Chanlett-Avery. Congressional Research Service. March 22, 2011. 11 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159781.pdf>

**YEMEN: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS**

By Jeremy M. Sharp. Congressional Research Service. March 22, 2011. 51 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159782.pdf>

**BAHRAIN: REFORM, SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY**

By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. March 21, 2011. 24 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159344.pdf>

**INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY**

By Liana Sun Wyler. Congressional Research Service. March 21, 2011. 52 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161357.pdf>

**“GANG OF FOUR” CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE NOTIFICATIONS**

By Alfred Cumming. Congressional Research Service. March 18, 2011. 11 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/161358.pdf>

**DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE:  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS**

By Jennifer K. Elsea, Richard F. Grimmett. Congressional Research Service. March 17, 2011. 112 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159328.pdf>

**HAITI'S NATIONAL ELECTIONS: ISSUES AND CONCERNS**

By Maureen Taft-Morales. Congressional Research Service. March 14, 2011. 18 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159331.pdf>

**SAUDI ARABIA: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS**

By Christopher M. Blanchard. Congressional Research Service. March 10, 2011. 17 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159350.pdf>

**THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE): ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY**

By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. March 10, 2011. 18 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159348.pdf>

**U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: BACKGROUND, DEVELOPMENTS, AND ISSUES**

By Amy F. Woolf. Congressional Research Service. March 10, 2011. 33 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/159349.pdf>

**TERRORIST USE OF THE INTERNET: INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE**

By Catherine A. Theohary, John Rollins. Congressional Research Service. March 8, 2011. 19 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/158490.pdf>

**CHINA AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILES: POLICY  
ISSUES**

By Shirley A. Kan. Congressional Research Service. March 3, 2011. 78 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/158483.pdf>

**CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE AND LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES:  
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES**

By Amy F. Woolf. Congressional Research Service. March 1, 2011. 41 pages.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/158471.pdf>

**IRAQ: POLITICS, ELECTIONS, AND BENCHMARKS**



By Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service. March 1, 2011. 35 pages.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/158475.pdf>

THINK TANKS AND RESEARCH CENTERS:

*The opinions expressed in these publications do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Government.*

AFGHANISTAN – PAKISTAN

**PAKISTAN PLAYS HARDBALL**

By Bruce Riedel. The Brookings Institution. April 18, 2011.  
[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0417\\_pakistan\\_riedel.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0417_pakistan_riedel.aspx)  
Tensions between Islamabad and Washington have reached a fever pitch in recent months. As President Obama plans a visit for later this year to the world's second-most-populous Muslim country, the White House wants above all else to fight Al Qaeda and wage its war in Afghanistan. Islamabad has something else in mind.

**A CONVERSATION ON AFGHANISTAN WITH GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS**

By Michael E. O'Hanlon. The Brookings Institution. March 18, 2011.  
[http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2011/0318\\_petraeus\\_afghanistan\\_ohanlon.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2011/0318_petraeus_afghanistan_ohanlon.aspx)  
Upon return from a research trip to Afghanistan, and while General David Petraeus was in Washington for Congressional testimony regarding the war in that country, Michael O'Hanlon held a discussion with the ISAF commander.

**AFGHANISTAN AND THE UNCERTAIN METRICS OF PROGRESS: PART FIVE: BUILDING EFFECTIVE AFGHAN FORCES**

By Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. March 8, 2011. 75 pages.  
[http://csis.org/files/publication/110308\\_Afghan\\_Metrics\\_part5.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/110308_Afghan_Metrics_part5.pdf)  
The war in Afghanistan is now in its tenth year. In spite of that fact, the U.S., allied countries, ISAF, and the UN have failed to develop credible reporting in the progress of the war, provide meaningful transparency on the problems and challenge it faces, and a meaningful plan for the future. Moreover, since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S. does provide has steadily shrunk in content -- effectively "spinning" the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead.

ARAB UPRISINGS

**SAUDI STABILITY IN A TIME OF CHANGE**

By Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. April 21, 2011. 21 pages.

[http://csis.org/files/publication/110421\\_saudi\\_stabilty\\_change.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/110421_saudi_stabilty_change.pdf)

The MENA region has begun a process of political change and turmoil that will take years to play out, and which could destabilize some MENA countries for a decade or more as a worst case. There is a tangible risk that Saudi Arabia will be affected in the short term, and it will take continued leadership and vision for it to deal with its longer-term internal challenges.

#### **LIBYA: WILL THE FARCE STAY WITH U.S. (AND FRANCE AND BRITAIN)?**

By Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. April 20, 2011.

<http://csis.org/publication/libya-will-farce-stay-us-and-france-and-britain>

At some point in time, it will be critical to examine the historical record behind the French, British, and U.S. intervention in Libya and why they dragged NATO and allies like Qatar and the UAE into such a gamble. It seems likely, however, that the choice to act came after watching the rebels advance with seeming ease towards Qaddafi's overthrow and suffer what still seemed like limited reverses. Given past cases, it is likely that regional, intelligence, and military experts in each country all expressed caution and gave warning about the problems and uncertainties involved, but were overruled by their respective political leaders, who saw their staffs as needlessly cautious.

#### **U.S. POLICY AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD**

By Nathan J. Brown. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April 13, 2011. 17 pages.

[http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0413\\_testimony\\_brown.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0413_testimony_brown.pdf)

As Egypt transitions to democracy, the once-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood is looking to play a more active role in the nation's political life. In testimony before the House Intelligence Committee, Nathan J. Brown explains why the Brotherhood does not pose a security threat to the United States and should be welcomed as a legitimate political actor.

#### **THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE ARAB AWAKENING**

By Shibley Telhami. The Brookings Institution. April 12, 2011. 17 pages.

[http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2011/0412\\_middle\\_east\\_poll\\_telhami/0412\\_middle\\_east\\_poll\\_telhami.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2011/0412_middle_east_poll_telhami/0412_middle_east_poll_telhami.pdf)

An overwhelming majority of Americans believe that greater democracy in the Middle East would be positive for the United States. Further, a solid majority would favor this happening even if this resulted in Middle Eastern countries becoming more likely to oppose U.S. policies. These are some of the findings of a new poll conducted by the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, directed by Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull. The poll of 802 Americans was fielded April 1-5, 2011 by Knowledge Networks.

#### **HANDLING THE MIDDLE EAST'S 'TECTONIC' SHIFTS**

Edward P. Djerejian, Director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman. The Council on Foreign Relations. April 1, 2011.

<http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/handling-middle-east-tectonic-shifts/p24551>

The United States needs to be on the side of those in the Middle East seeking “fundamental political, economic, and human rights,” says Edward P. Djerejian, a former ambassador to Syria and Israel. But during this period of turmoil, which Djerejian sees as the end of the post-colonial period in the region, the United States must “differentiate” its support.

### **THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARAB SPRING**

By Kemal Derviş. The Brookings Institution. April 1, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0401\\_obama\\_arab\\_spring\\_dervis.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0401_obama_arab_spring_dervis.aspx)

There has been a lot of criticism as to how the Obama administration has handled the Libyan crisis, amidst a wider debate on the Arab Spring and U.S. policy. Most of the critics point to indecisiveness, unwillingness to lead and lack of clarity in defining the objectives for the United States or the international community. The author disagrees with these critics and claims that the Obama administration not only lent its support to the no-fly zone, but through skillful and, in fact, decisive diplomacy at the UN, was critical in securing the crucial UNSC resolution. The future of the Arab countries depends to an overwhelming degree on internal dynamics. It is up to them, not outsiders, to formulate objectives and to determine their future.

### **FORGING A LIBYA STRATEGY: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION**

By Andrew M. Exum, Zachary M. Hosford. Center for a New American Security. March 28, 2011. 6 pages.

[http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\\_Libya\\_ExumHosford.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Libya_ExumHosford.pdf)

While the situation in Libya continues to change rapidly, the most prudent course of action for the United States is to execute a strategy that would minimize the U.S. commitment to Libya and protect the United States from a potentially protracted and resource-intensive conflict, according to this policy brief.

### **UN-UNIFIED OPPOSITIONS IN BAHRAIN AND YEMEN**

Kristin Smith Diwan, School of International Service, American University. The Council on Foreign Relations. March 23, 2011.

<http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/un-unified-oppositions-bahrain-yemen/p24464>

Bahrain's pro-democracy uprising, initially supported by both Sunnis and Shiites, is being painted by an alarmed leadership and its Saudi ally as a pro-Iranian effort to increase power and influence in Gulf countries, an explanation being used by the Bahrain monarchy to justify its tough response.

### **WHY MIDDLE EAST MONARCHIES MIGHT HOLD ON**

By Shadi Hamid. The Brookings Institution. March 8, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0308\\_middle\\_east\\_hamid.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0308_middle_east_hamid.aspx)

Arab monarchies were long thought to be more favorable to democratization than republics. Monarchs who enjoyed popular legitimacy and political security are on balance more willing to take risks, the argument went, gradually letting go of power and embarking on potentially destabilizing reforms. Since kings do not depend on elections to maintain power, they have less to fear from holding them. But the region's uprisings seem to demonstrate that republics are the most promising candidates for systemic change. Egypt and Tunisia, both led by unpopular presidents, were the first to go. The other likely candidates for revolutions -- Libya, Yemen, and possibly Algeria -- are all republics.

### ASIA

#### **CHINA-IRAN TIES: ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY**

By Michael Mazza. Iran Tracker. American Enterprise Institute. April 21, 2011.

<http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/michael-mazza-china-iran-ties-assessment-and-implications-us-policy-april-21-2011>

The China-Iran relationship poses a significant challenge to international efforts to isolate Iran and pressure its leaders to abandon their nuclear program. It is problematic for the United States as well, not only because it frustrates Washington's Iran policy, but also because the ultimate outcome of the Iran challenge has wider consequences for U.S. global leadership and credibility.

### BIN LADEN

#### **THE IMPLICATIONS OF OSAMA BIN LADEN'S DEATH FOR THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS**

By Vanda Felbab-Brown. The Brookings Institution. May 2, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502\\_bin\\_laden\\_afghanistan\\_felbabbrown.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502_bin_laden_afghanistan_felbabbrown.aspx)

The death of Osama bin Laden is a very significant positive development in the global effort against salafi terrorism. After almost ten years of hunting after him since September 2001 and for many years more prior to that, United States operatives finally managed to eliminate America's No. 1 enemy.

#### **IRAQ AND THE DEATH OF BIN LADEN**

By Kenneth M. Pollack. The Brookings Institution. May 2, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502\\_bin\\_laden\\_iraq\\_pollack.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502_bin_laden_iraq_pollack.aspx)

According to the author, the good news for America's Iraq policy stemming from the death of Osama bin Laden is that it probably won't have much of an impact at all. Unfortunately, that's also the bad news.

#### **OSAMA BIN LADEN'S LEGEND WILL SERVE JIHADIST MOVEMENT**

By Michael E. O'Hanlon. The Brookings Institution. May 2, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/multimedia/video/2011/0502\\_ohanlon\\_osama\\_bin\\_laden.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/multimedia/video/2011/0502_ohanlon_osama_bin_laden.aspx)

Osama bin Laden's greatest contribution to Al Qaeda may have been his charisma and his ability to incite violence against the West. In this video Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon says bin Laden's influence will not be diminished by his death.

### **OBL IS DEAD, AL QAEDA ISN'T**

By Daniel L. Byman. The Brookings Institution. May 2, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502\\_osama\\_bin\\_laden\\_byman.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502_osama_bin_laden_byman.aspx)

The U.S. special forces raid that killed Osama bin Laden in his hideout in Pakistan is a devastating blow to al Qaeda. The terrorist organization and the movement it leads now face a potential leadership void and internal divisions. But the battle is far from over: aggressive U.S. and allied action -- including military, and particularly, intelligence measures -- are necessary to make a bad situation worse for al Qaeda.

### **U.S.-PAKISTAN: BAD UNION, NO DIVORCE**

By Michael E. O'Hanlon. The Brookings Institution. May 2, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502\\_pakistan\\_ohanlon.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502_pakistan_ohanlon.aspx)

The U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1 underscores the complexity of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Washington clearly could never have accomplished this combat raid without intelligence gleaned over the years, in part with Pakistan's help. Yet bin Laden appears to have been living for an extended period in a compound in a town with many Pakistani military officers and retirees who, at a minimum, should have known enough to be suspicious. And U.S. combat helicopters flew over at least dozens of miles of Pakistani territory without telling Islamabad about it beforehand. It even seems possible that Pakistan had no interest in helping the U.S. find bin Laden in recent years.

### **THE WAR ON TERROR AFTER OSAMA BIN LADEN: A LIMITED DEMORALIZING EFFECT**

By Vanda Felbab-Brown. The Brookings Institution. May 2, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502\\_osama\\_bin\\_laden\\_felbabbrown.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502_osama_bin_laden_felbabbrown.aspx)

Osama bin Laden's death has strategic implications for the global struggle against salafi terrorism, the war in Afghanistan and U.S.-Pakistan relations. Neither al Qaeda nor other salafi terrorist groups are tightly hierarchically organized and thus are not easily susceptible to collapse even with the elimination of the group's leader. Nonetheless, even salafi networks are sensitive to major disruption of leadership.

### **STATEMENT ON OSAMA BIN LADEN'S DEATH**

By John Podesta. Center for American Progress. May 2, 2011.

[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/05/bin\\_laden\\_statement.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/05/bin_laden_statement.html)

Nearly 10 years after the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, justice is now served upon the criminal most responsible for the murder of 3,000 Americans, according to the author.

Osama bin Laden is dead as a result of the tenacious pursuit by U.S. intelligence and two Navy SEAL units ordered into action by President Barack Obama yesterday.

### **THE DEATH OF OSAMA BIN LADEN, AND THE SHAPE OF THREATS TO COME**

By Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. May 2, 2011.

<http://csis.org/publication/death-osama-bin-laden-and-shape-threats-come>

No American -- or anyone else who opposes violent, murderous terrorism -- can see Osama Bin Laden's death as anything but just retribution, according to the author. People need to be very cautious, however, in assuming that it will now damage Al Qa'ida and other Islamist extremist networks, or that we can predict the political and strategic consequences.

### **BIN LADEN IS DEAD: IS IT TIME TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN?**

By Robert D. Lamb. Center for Strategic and International Studies. May 2, 2011.

<http://csis.org/publication/bin-laden-dead-it-time-leave-afghanistan>

Minutes after word leaked to the media that President Obama would soon be announcing Osama bin Laden's death, some in both camps were already arguing that bin Laden's death calls for a rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan: we did what we went there to do, so why delay? In fact, the drawdown from Afghanistan is already scheduled to begin this summer and is anticipated to end in 2014, but this news surely will intensify the debate about how steep the off-ramp should be.

### **7 QUESTIONS ON THE DEATH OF BIN LADEN**

By James M. Lindsay. The Council on Foreign Relations. May 2, 2011.

<http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/7-questions-death-bin-laden/p24849>

Americans are cheering the surprising news that U.S. Special Forces have killed Osama bin Laden. The successful military operation is a tribute to the skill of U.S. Special Forces, the perseverance of intelligence professionals who have hunted bin Laden for more than a decade and the nerve of a president to order a military strike that could have failed spectacularly. The strike on bin Laden's compound also raises lots of questions.

### **WHAT'S NEXT FOR AL-QAEDA?**

The Council on Foreign Relations. May 2, 2011.

<http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/next-al-qaeda/p24862>

Osama bin Laden's death in a raid by U.S. troops on his compound north of Islamabad, Pakistan, is both a symbolic and real blow to al-Qaeda. But will it mean an end to terrorism or to al-Qaeda's hold on the imaginations of radicals in the Middle East and elsewhere? Most likely it won't, according to five CFR experts who weighed in on the subject.

### **THE BIN LADEN AFTERMATH: THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN ARE STILL STUCK WITH EACH OTHER**

By Lisa Curtis. The Heritage Foundation. May 3, 2011.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2011/05/The-bin-Laden-aftermath-The-US-and-Pakistan-are-still-stuck-with-each-other>

The fact that U.S. soldiers apparently went undetected by Pakistani forces, and thus avoided a potentially disastrous military confrontation with our so-called “ally” in the fight against terrorism, is noteworthy. But avoiding these pitfalls was only half the battle. Now the U.S. must deal with the fallout from the momentous event that has once again exposed deep fissures in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. In spite of these fault lines, neither the U.S. nor Pakistan can afford to allow the partnership to rupture.

#### **MORNING BELL: BIN LADEN DEAD**

By Edwin J. Feulner. The Heritage Foundation. May 2, 2011.

<http://blog.heritage.org/2011/05/02/morning-bell-bin-laden-dead/>

Bin Laden’s death is the most significant victory in the war on terror since the 9/11 attacks, more important than the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006. Bin Laden’s elimination vindicates U.S. strategy in the region, started under President George W. Bush, and it will be seen as a major success for the United States, showing the world that America will remain committed to hunting down its enemies for as long as it takes. But while America should take great satisfaction in this tremendous achievement, the United States must remain vigilant against a terrorist threat that is not yet vanquished.

#### **AFTER BIN LADEN: NEXT STEPS TO WINNING THE LONG WAR**

By James Carafano. The Heritage Foundation. May 2, 2011.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/After-bin-Laden-Next-Steps-to-Winning-the-Long-War>

Mark the end of Osama bin Laden as a victory in the long war against terrorism, but as President Obama acknowledged in his address announcing the operation, the war is not over. The President and Congress should renew their resolve to finish the job, which will require continued commitment.

### **DEFENSE**

#### **CRUMBLING WALL BETWEEN THE PENTAGON AND CIA**

By Micah Zenko. The Council on Foreign Relations. April 28, 2011.

<http://www.cfr.org/united-states/crumbling-wall-between-pentagon-cia/p24812>

That Obama is expected to announce today CIA Director Leon Panetta as his choice to replace departing Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and Gen. David Petraeus as his pick for CIA Director reflects the further erosion of what was once a high wall between the CIA and the Defense Department.

#### **DEFENSIBLE BUDGET CUTS**

By Lawrence J. Korb, Alex Rothman, Laura Conley. Center for American Progress. April 13, 2011.

[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/korb\\_obama.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/korb_obama.html)

President Barack Obama's plan to cut \$400 billion in security spending by 2023 is an admirable but modest first step toward getting the nation's fiscal house in order. After 13 straight years of real growth in the baseline defense budget--the longest period of sustained real growth in U.S. history--the United States now spends more on defense than it has at any point since the end of World War II, including during the peak of the Cold War. This level of spending is not only disproportionate to current national security threats but also negatively affects U.S. national security by growing the federal budget deficit and undermining the overall health of our economy.

### **THE CHALLENGES AFTER GATES**

By Andrew F. Krepinevich. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). April 11, 2011.

<http://www.csbaonline.org/2011/04/11/the-challenges-after-gates/>

Whoever takes the reins at the Pentagon after Robert Gates' departure will face a formidable array of challenges: spread of weapons, cyber threats, tight budgets await but also, several other storm clouds visible on the security horizon.

### **THE PUBLIC'S DISCONNECT WITH THE MILITARY**

By Lawrence J. Korb. Center for American Progress. April 5, 2011.

[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/atw\\_sign\\_on\\_korb.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/atw_sign_on_korb.html)

Military leaders are rightly becoming concerned about the increasing gulf between military people and society in a time when this nation is engaged in two long wars. There is no doubt that these military leaders are correct and that this should be of concern to the country. There are three reasons for the current state of affairs.

### **DEVELOPING U.S. ARMY OFFICERS' CAPABILITIES FOR JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS**

By M. Wade Markel, Henry A. Leonard, Charlotte Lynch, Christina Panis, Peter Schirmer, Carra S. Sims. The RAND Corporation. 2011. 171 pages.

[http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\\_MG990.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG990.pdf)

Law, policy, and, most importantly, ongoing operations require the Department of Defense and the Army to develop a cadre of officers skilled in the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) capabilities into military operations. Based on interviews and focus groups with Army officers and their counterparts and co-workers from other services, agencies, and nations, this monograph identifies and describes the knowledge, skills, and abilities that enable Army officers to succeed in JIIM contexts. Using surveys of experts in officer assignments, the researchers identified the kinds of assignments that develop capabilities in these domains. They also used inventory modeling to assess the Army's ability to develop and maintain a cadre of officers with these capabilities.



## DIPLOMACY

### **WITHDRAWING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS: A MISGUIDED ASSAULT**

By Sarah Margon, John Norris. Center for American Progress. May 2, 2011. 13 pages.

[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/pdf/un\\_report.pdf](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/pdf/un_report.pdf)

It is remarkable that lawmakers in Washington are considering slashing U.S. financial commitments to multilateral institutions such as the United Nations with so much ongoing global turmoil. Withholding funds from the United Nations would fail to reap significant savings, make it more difficult for the United States to lead, and seriously undermine its highest foreign policy and national security priorities.

## HUMAN RIGHTS

### **WHY THE U.S. MUST STAY ON THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL**

By Ted Piccone. The Brookings Institution. April 1, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0401\\_human\\_rights\\_piccone.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0401_human_rights_piccone.aspx)

The Obama Administration is proving what a difference a determined, constructive and plain smart strategy on human rights at the United Nations can make. Just three years ago, the United States absented itself from the world's principal diplomatic forum for human rights because it felt it couldn't get its way on every issue. As a result, it ceded important ground to the very governments it criticized for their human rights practices, leaving America's closest allies, including Israel, and human rights defenders around the world exposed. Now, after two years of active engagement as a member of the Human Rights Council, the United States can show real results that prove that staying and fighting for its core values is worth the effort.

## IRAN

### **U.S. AND IRANIAN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: IRAN'S PERCEPTIONS OF ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM AND COMPETITION WITH THE U.S. AND THE GULF, SEPT. 2010 - FEB. 2011**

By Anthony H. Cordesman, Alexander Wilner. Burke Chair in Strategy. Center for Strategic and International Studies. April 25, 2011. 39 pages.

[http://csis.org/files/publication/110425\\_Iran\\_Ballistic\\_Missiles\\_wilner.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/110425_Iran_Ballistic_Missiles_wilner.pdf)

With the assistance of Adam Seitz of the Marine Corps University, the Burke Chair has compiled a series of chronological reports that focus on Iranian perceptions of national security and assess Iran's intentions concerning competition with the US.

## LATIN AMERICA

### **SECURITY THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: FIGHTING TRANSNATIONAL CARTELS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

By Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.), Matthew Irvine. Center for a New American Security. March 21, 2011. 6 pages.

[http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\\_Partnership\\_KillebrewIrvine.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Partnership_KillebrewIrvine.pdf)

The most dangerous threat to the United States and its allies in the Western Hemisphere is the growth of powerful transnational criminal organizations in Mexico and Central America, according to the authors. In this policy brief, they write that increased regional cooperation -- which has been a topic of President Obama's Latin America tour -- is needed to combat the growing violence and instability in the Western Hemisphere.

#### **PRESIDENT OBAMA IN EL SALVADOR**

By Kevin Casas-Zamora. The Brookings Institution. March 16, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0316\\_obama\\_el\\_salvador\\_casaszamora.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0316_obama_el_salvador_casaszamora.aspx)

President Obama's upcoming visit to El Salvador has at least three important meanings. First, this visit is about Central America, but is also about El Salvador and President Mauricio Funes. Second, El Salvador is a place where three crucial issues in U.S.-Latin America relations converge with unusual clarity -- immigration, free trade and security. Finally, Obama's trip to El Salvador is a sign that the U.S. is finally paying some attention to Central America's deteriorating political and security situation.

#### **OBAMA'S VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA: REDEFINING U.S.-BRAZIL RELATIONS**

By Carlos Pereira, Carlos Aramayo. The Brookings Institution. March 15, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0315\\_brazil\\_us\\_aramayo\\_pereira.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0315_brazil_us_aramayo_pereira.aspx)

President Obama's visit to Brazil comes at an important time in U.S.-Brazil relations. Over the past eight years of President Lula's government in Brazil, serious disagreements emerged between the two countries. In particular, the former Brazilian president angered the United States when his government sought closer ties with Iran in an attempt to support Iran's development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Despite this and other diplomatic setbacks, relations between the two countries still remain fairly constructive on a range of issues, including counter-narcotics, trade, energy, the environment, promoting bio-fuels, intellectual property rights and providing security in Haiti.

### MEXICO

#### **THE DRUG WAR IN MEXICO: CONFRONTING A SHARED THREAT**

By David A. Shirk. The Council on Foreign Relations. March 2011. 57 pages.

[http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Mexico\\_CSR60.pdf](http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Mexico_CSR60.pdf)

The drug war in Mexico has caused some U.S. analysts to view Mexico as a failed or failing state. While these fears are exaggerated, the problems of widespread crime and violence, government corruption, and inadequate access to justice pose grave challenges for the Mexican state. The Obama administration has therefore affirmed its commitment to assist Mexico through continued bilateral collaboration, funding for judicial and security sector reform, and building "resilient communities." David A. Shirk analyzes the drug war in Mexico, explores Mexico's capacities and limitations, examines the factors that have

undermined effective state performance, assesses the prospects for U.S. support to strengthen critical state institutions, and offers recommendations for reducing the potential of state failure.

#### **MEXICO'S CALDERON AND OBAMA MEET: TIME FOR A RONALD REAGAN MOMENT**

By Ray Walser. The Heritage Foundation. March 2, 2011.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/03/Mexicos-Calderon-and-Obama-Meet-Time-for-a-Ronald-Reagan-Moment>

Even White House media management cannot camouflage gathering tensions in the U.S.-Mexican relationship. Mexico's drug war has made it difficult for the two leaders to address other pressing issues, from economic and trade matters to needed cooperation in everything from border management, environment, and energy issues. But at the heart of the U.S.-Mexico challenge is the fact that the drug war is being conducted in two different strategic dimensions at variable speeds.

#### **NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST**

#### **FATAH-HAMAS AGREEMENT PRESENTS OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES**

By Matthew Duss. Center for American Progress. April 29, 2011.

[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/fatah\\_hamas.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/fatah_hamas.html)

Wednesday's joint announcement in Cairo by representatives of the Palestinian political factions Fatah and Hamas that they had reached a preliminary agreement on the contours of a unity government, with new elections to be held after a year, marks an important new chapter in the Palestinian peoples' quest for statehood. It also presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the Obama administration that should be understood against the backdrop of the broader challenges and opportunities that have arisen as part of the Arab revolutions that have swept the Middle East over the past months.

#### **STATES OF CONFLICT: AN UPDATE**

By Michael E. O'Hanlon. The Brookings Institution. April 10, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0412\\_iraq\\_ohanlon.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0412_iraq_ohanlon.aspx)

Leaving aside all the new conflicts in the Middle East, how are the United States' longstanding struggles in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan going? This document provides an update of the situation with comments and tables.

#### **TERRORISM - COUNTERTERRORISM**

#### **SECURING LOOSE WEAPONS SHOULD BE A PRIORITY IN LIBYA**

By Kaitlin Oujo. Center for American Progress. April 28, 2011.

[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/weapons\\_libya.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/weapons_libya.html)

Many off-base comparisons have been made between the wars in Iraq and Libya. But there is one critical mistake in the Iraq war the Obama administration would be wise to learn from. The Bush administration's failure to secure Saddam's Hussein's massive weapons caches in the early months of the war is often cited as the primary reason the insurgency was able to successfully arm itself. Similarly, the threat from Libya's loose weapons poses security challenges both inside the country and throughout the region.

### **AL QAEDA SMELLS BLOOD**

By Bruce Riedel. The Brookings Institution. April 6, 2011.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0406\\_yemen\\_al\\_qaeda\\_riedel.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0406_yemen_al_qaeda_riedel.aspx)

As President Ali Abdullah Saleh steadily loses support at home and abroad—including in Washington and Riyadh--al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula seems increasingly poised to be a major winner in Yemen. The AQAP threat to American cities and to the other states in the peninsula is going to increase as al Qaeda adapts to the new environment in the Muslim world.

### **THE EU-U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM RELATIONSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR COOPERATION**

By Sally McNamara. The Heritage Foundation. March 8, 2011.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/03/The-EU-US-Counterterrorism-Relationship-An-Agenda-for-Cooperation>

The EU-U.S. counterterrorism relationship has been marked during the last decade as much by confrontation as it has by cooperation. As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, the powers of the European Parliament have grown immensely, and the parliament opposes several key -- and successful-- U.S. data-sharing programs. Instead, the parliament supports a greater counterterrorism role from untested EU institutions, such as Europol and Eurojust. The EU's supranational approach often comes at the expense of more effective relations between the U.S. and individual EU states. The author, a Heritage Foundation EU and transatlantic security expert lays out an agenda for fruitful cooperation between Europe and the United States.

### **THE TENTH YEAR: A BRIEFING ON TERRORISM ISSUES TO NEW MEMBERS OF THE 112TH CONGRESS**

By Brian Michael Jenkins. The RAND Corporation. 2011. 15 pages.

[http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate\\_pubs/2011/RAND\\_CP625.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/2011/RAND_CP625.pdf)

The United States has not experienced another major terrorist attack since September 11, 2001, which many had feared. However, few in 2001 would have imagined that, ten years later, the United States would still be threatened by the same jihadist terrorist enterprise. Its effort to defeat and dismantle this global network while protecting itself against further attacks has become its longest campaign. On January 8, 2011, Brian Michael Jenkins briefed newly elected members of Congress on a spectrum of foreign policy, national security, and domestic issues, with a particular focus on domestic terrorism prevention and transportation security in the post-9/11 era.

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